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Local Government Law
by IL Perry Sentell, Jr.*
The year was one of concern and hope, in both private and public
affairs. As for the latter, the concern encompassed local government's
continuing need for inordinate expenditures of both judicial and
legislative attention. The hope was that, at some point, local government would "get it right." This survey graphically illustrates the causes
for concern; it also affords glimmers of reason for hope.'
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

Officers and Employees
Essential though they be, municipal officers and employees were
largely unsuccessful in their appearances before the appellate courts
during this survey period. Providing intriguing illustration of this point,
City of Baldwin v. Barrett' featured a mayor's actions in both quo
warranto' and mandamus4 for his suspension from office by the city
A.

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard
University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Deep appreciation is expressed to the Carl Vinson Institute of Government of the
University of Georgia for summer research support which contributed most significantly
to the preparation of this survey.
1. For a general "profile" of local government law, those who practice it and the practice
itself, based on a survey of Georgia city and county attorneys, canvassing personal
backgrounds of local government lawyers, governmental backgrounds, the local government
attorney's position, administrative facets of the position, substantive facets of the position,
and general assessments of the local government practice, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., A
PROFILE: THE PEOPLE AND THE PRACTICE OF GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1995),

jointly published by the Georgia Municipal Association and the Association County
Commissioners of Georgia, Atlanta.
2. 265 Ga. 489, 458 S.E.2d 619 (1995).
3. For perspective upon the historic writ, and its prominence in local government law,
see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT

LAW (1987).
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council.5 Reversing the trial judge's issuance of the mandamus, the
supreme court reviewed the mayor's earlier plea bargain "with the
district attorney to forego seeking or holding public office in exchange for
the dismissal of certain criminal charges and for lenient treatment
following his plea of guilty to two felony offenses."' That bargain, the
court held, "is a contract under Georgia law which binds both the
prosecutor and defendant."7 Accordingly, the mayor "was ineligible to
run in the 1993 mayoral election,"' and possessed "no clear legal right"
necessary for mandamus.'
Another facet of charged official misconduct surfaced in Sanderson v.
State,10 a municipal police officer's effort to invoke "certain privileges"
not afforded other defendants." In countering a misdemeanor accusation in state court, the officer claimed entitlement to indictment by

4. For perspective upon the historic writ and its overuse in local government law, see
R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMus IN GEORGIA LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW

(1988). On the point of overuse, see another survey period case, Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys.
v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996). There, the supreme court held invalid an
agreement between the city and the city independent school system under which the
system received an amount equal to 30% of the city's local option sales tax receipts. That
contract violated the constitution, art. VIII, § VI, para. I(a), prohibiting any school system
from receiving funds from any tax source other than ad valorem taxes. Yet, mandamus,
the court held, would not lie to compel the system to repay the funds illegally received:
"mandamus relief applies prospectively only." 266 Ga. at 660, 469 S.E.2d at 26.
Additionally, the court held, plaintiff taxpayer could not mandamus the city to sue the
school system: "Since the City's suit against the System would probably prove to be
ineffectual and, even if the City did prevail, its taxpayers would not benefit, it was not an
abuse of discretion to deny (taxpayer's] mandamus claim against the City." Id.
5. 265 Ga. at 489, 458 S.E.2d at 619. The council had effected the suspension under
a provision of the municipal charter allowing temporary suspension of a mayor under
felony indictment. 1986 Ga. Laws 5587.
6. 265 Ga. at 490, 458 S.E.2d at 621. The mayor was indicted in 1991, executed the
plea bargain, was sentenced and discharged from probation in 1992, was again elected
mayor in 1993, was reindicted on the original charges in 1994, and was then suspended
from office by the council. Id.
7. Id. at 490, 458 S.E.2d at 621. "The agreement was sanctioned by the court and
incorporated into the sentencing order as a condition of probation." Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. "Election results cannot cure his ineligibility." Id. at 490-91, 458 S.E.2d at 621.
10. 217 Ga. App. 51, 456 S.E.2d 667 (1995).
11. Id. at 52, 456 S.E.2d at 668. Those privileges reside in O.C.G.A. § 45-11-4, and
include the officer's notification of the charges, presence when evidence against him is
presented, and the opportunity to make a sworn statement before the grand jury. Id. For
treatment of this statute in the context of local government law, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Georgia Local Gouernment Officials and the Grand Jury, 26 GA. ST. B.J. 50 (1989).
12. 217 Ga. App. at 52, 456 S.E.2d at 668. Defendant had been charged by accusation
in state court with two counts of simple battery, a misdemeanor. Id. at 51, 456 S.E.2d at
667.
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grand jury. The court of appeals rejected the officer's claim by interpreting the grand jury statute: 3 that measure "says that if a public official
is indicted for alleged misconduct, he is entitled to certain rights; it does
not say that a public official charged with misconduct must be indicted,
or that he is entitled to those rights if he is not." 4
5 went to
The employment claims in Smith v. City of LaGrange"
retirement benefits, specifically the municipality's alleged mismanagement of early retirement incentive programs. 6 Holding plaintiff former
employees devoid of standing to raise constitutional challenges, 7 the
court of appeals focused upon plaintiffs' argument of "duty." s That
duty, the court asserted, "would require the City to inform employees of
proposals being considered by the city council or proposals that may be
presented to the city council in the future." 19 Rejecting plaintiffs' claim
of a "fiduciary relationship,"" the court noted an absence of evidence
that the municipality knew the incentive programs would be forthcoming. "The City's lack of knowledge of and inability to predict the future
conduct of the city council and the mayor precludes plaintiffs' claim for
breach of any duty."2'

13. Id. at 52, 456 S.E.2d at 668. It was necessary, the court found, to "harmonize" that
statute with other, later, statutes (O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-71, 15-7-46), "allowing prosecutors to
charge misdemeanors by accusation and to proceed in state court without a grand jury's
indictment...." Those later statutes, the court emphasized, "did not make an exception
for charges against public officials," Id.
14. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the police officer's plea in
abatement. Id.
15. 218 Ga. App. 394, 461 8.E.2d 550 (1995).
16. Id. at 394, 461 S.E.2d at 550. Essentially, plaintiffs complained of the loss of
benefits regarding post-retirement health insurance premiums, benefits included in early
retirement incentive programs adopted or administered after plaintiffs' respective
retirements. Id.
17. Id. at 395, 461 S.E.2d at 552. One plaintiff had retired prior to the adoption of the
first program; the other plaintiffs were timely made aware of the first program and retired
prior to the administration of the second program. Thus, "because plaintiffs were not
affected adversely by the administration of the incentive programs, they have no standing
to make such a challenge." Id.
18. Id. at 396, 461 S.E.2d at 551. Plaintiffs claimed that the municipality had
"breached their employment contracts, breached its fiduciary duty, and committed
negligent and fraudulent acts in the administration of its retirement benefit plan." Id.
19. Id. at 395, 461 S.E.2d at 552.
20. Id. at 395-96, 461 S.E.2d at 552. "Plaintiffs' attempt to establish such a duty by
claiming a fiduciary relationship existed between themselves and the City is not
persuasive." Id,
21. Id. at 396,461 S.E.2d at 552. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge's grant
of the municipality's motion for summary judgment. Id.
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B. Elections
The election to fill the office of municipal mayor may, on occasion,
misfire. In Stuckey v. Storms,22 it resulted in a victory for one of two
candidates by a majority of two votes," clouded further by the fact that24
"three ballots were found in the stub box and were not counted."
Upon the losing candidate's petition to contest the results, the supreme
court noted evidence that "voter confusion was caused by the misleading
form of the ballot and compounded by a lack of assistance at the polling
place." 5 In those circumstances, plaintiff had established that sufficient legal votes were rejected to place the result in doubt, 2 and the
court affirmed the trial judge's invalidation of the election.27
C. Recall
The recall procedure is steeped in history; it offers voters a more
immediate solution to unsatisfactory government than does the election
process itself.2 In effecting that solution, however, the disgruntled
voters must toe the prescribed procedural mark; this was the issue of
George v. Baker.29 In George, four municipal council members sought
to enjoin a recall election, on grounds that the petitions had been filed
in less than six months of previous invalid petitions.8 0 Consequently,
plaintiffs maintained, the effort contravened the recall statute's
proscription 3 1 that "'[ilf the election superintendent finds that a recall
petition is insufficient' no further application ... shall be filed for six

22. 265 Ga. 491, 458 S.E.2d 344 (1995).
23. Id. at 491, 458 S.E.2d at 344. The mayor's election was a special one. Id.
24. Id. at 492, 458 S.E.2d at 346.
25. Id. The court emphasized the confusing form of the ballot, its violation of the
Georgia Municipal Election Code (O.C.G.A. §§ 21-3-187-188), and that the violation "could
have caused the ballot to mislead voters to deposit the number strip into the ballot box and
the remainder of the ballot into the stub box." Id.
26. Id. at 493, 458 S.E.2d at 346-47. The court reasoned that the plaintiff need not
show that the rejected ballots would have been in her favor, but only were such as to place
the results in doubt. Id.
27. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 347. Plaintiff had presented evidence "that the fault therefor is
attributable, not to the electors, but to election officials." Id.
28. For perspective, with particular emphasis upon Georgia, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Remembering Recall in Local Government Law, 10 GA. L. REV. 883 (1976).
29. 265 Ga. 858, 463 S.E.2d 124 (1995).
30. Id. at 858, 463 S.E.2d at 124. A trial court had held the previous petitions invalid
and, while that decision was on appeal, new recall applications were filed. Id. at 859, 463
S.E.2d at 125.
31. O.C.G.A. § 21-4-14(b) (1993).
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months."" In rejecting plaintiffs' position, the supreme court delineated the statutory proscription from the instance presented: "In this case,
because a trial court and not the elections superintendent held that the
initial recall petition was invalid, [the proscription] is inapplicable."'
Accordingly, the contested recall election could proceed.

D. Power
Municipal "power" comes in a wide assortment of contexts, and its
issues surface across the substantive spectrum of the law. One highly
charged point on that spectrum pits municipal power against the
inhibiting confines of estoppel.3 4 The face-off is an impressive one, and
it recently received instructive emphasis in City of Atlanta v. Black. 5
The case featured a settlement agreement executed by two assistant city
attorneys (on behalf of the municipality) with private claimants.3 " The
problem arose from the municipal attorneys' violation of an ordinance
requiring settlements to first be approved by the municipal council. 7
Urging that the attorneys' actions were nevertheless binding, claimants
deemed the municipality estopped to deny the settlement's validity 8

32. 265 Ga. at 859, 463 S.E.2d at 125 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 21-4-14(b)).
33. Id. Rejecting an unreasonableness attack upon the distinction, the court focused
upon "the longer time frame inherently involved in receiving a judicial finding of
insufficiency," as well as the judiciary's broader area of review. "Distinguishing between

insufficiency findings by an elections superintendent and by a court is not unreasonable
or arbitrary." Id.
34. For perspective, see R. PERRY

SENTELL, JR., THE DOcTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN

GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw (1985).
35. 265 Ga. 425, 457 S.E.2d 551 (1995).

36. Id. at 425, 475 S.E.2d at 552. The agreement provided for a monetary payment to
claimants. Id. at 428, 457 S.E.2d at 553.
37. Id. at 425, 457 S.E.2d at 552. The assistant city attorneys possessed no such

authority and the municipal council refused to adopt the agreement. Id.
38. Id. at 428, 457 S.E.2d at 553. The case came to the supreme court from the
Eleventh Circuit via the following certified question: "Does an express restriction on a City
attorney's right to settle a cause of action embodied in a municipal ordinance, which is not
specifically communicated by the City or its attorney to an opposing party, circumscribe
the City attorney's apparent authority to bind his client to a settlement agreement?" Id.

at 425, 457 S.E.2d at 552.
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The supreme court sketched both the statutory 9 and judicial 4°
history of public estoppel, concluding that "the authority of public sector
attorneys, -as with all other public officers, must be deemed limited by
the laws that define and prescribe their authority."4 ' It is the duty of
persons dealing with public attorneys, the court declared, to determine
their compliance with those limitations.42 In this case, claimants took
no "reasonable steps" to ascertain the attorneys' settlement authority,
and the attorneys made no representations that they had obtained the
authority.43 Accordingly, the court concluded, the
municipality was not
44
estopped to deny the validity of the settlement.
A settlement agreement, but in a distinctly contrasting context,
likewise constituted the focal point of Hamsley v. City of Unadilla.5

There, upon taxpayer protest of its purchase of property, the city sold
one of the parcels for the outstanding principal amount and conveyed
cash and the second parcel to the financing bank.46 Affirming the trial
judge's approval of this agreement, the supreme court found considerable
municipal discretion in exercising a legally delegated power.47 Holding

39. Id. at 426, 457 S.E.2d at 552. "Powers of all public officers are defined by law and
all persons must take notice thereof. The public may not be estopped by the acts of any
officer done in the exercise of an unconferred power." Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5).
40. City of Summerville v. Georgia Power Co., 205 Ga. 843,55 S.E.2d 540 (1949): "The
doctrine of estoppel is not applied as freely against a municipal corporation as against an
individual.'" Id. at 845-46, 55 S.E.2d at 543 (citing City of Jefferson v. Holder, 195 Ga.
346, 355, 24 S.E.2d 187, 192 (1943)).
41. 265 Ga. at 428, 457 S.E.2d at 553.
42. Id. at 426, 457 S.E.2d at 552. "Furthermore, plaintiffs were under a duty to
determine that the Council had preapproved the settlement terms as to monetary amounts
in excess of $500." Id. at 428, 457 S.E.2d at 553.
43. Id., 457 S.E.2d at 554.
44. Id. at 429, 457 S.E.2d at 554. "[W]e hold that a public sector attorney's authority,
like that of any other public officer, is defined and prescribed by law, including municipal
ordinances such as the municipal ordinance in issue in this case." Id.
Justice Carley, joined by Justice Thompson, dissented on grounds that the public
estoppel statute was inapplicable: "In my opinion, the 'powers' and 'acts' of an attorney
engaged in representing a governmental entity in a legal proceeding are in no way
equivalent to the 'powers' and'acts' of a 'public officer' as that term is employed in O.C.G.A.
§ 45-6-5." 265 Ga. at 430, 457 S.E.2d at 555 (Carley, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the
claimants were owed a specific communication of any limitations upon the attorneys'
authority to settle on behalf of the municipality, Id.
45. 265 Ga. 494, 458 S.E.2d 627 (1995).
46. Id. at 494, 458 S.E.2d at 627. Upon the taxpayer protest, the bank intervened to
enforce payment, thus yielding the consent agreement between the municipality and the
bank at issue in the case. Id.
47. For exposition of that precept, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in GeorgiaLocal
Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV.614 (1974). "This rule means that courts do not inquire
into the economy or wisdom of a city's discretionary act when the city council has authority
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that discretion to control,48 the court reasoned that "[t]he settlement
agreement resolved a genuine dispute that the city had the possibility
of losing, obligated the city to pay less money than the bank demanded,
and avoided the payment of attorney's fees to further defend against the
bank's claim." 9
The municipal power exercise failed the court of appeals' review in
Grove v. Sugar Hill Investment Associates.'0 There, plaintiffs attacked
the validity of a municipal resolution approving a "restated lease and
operating agreement" with the city's solid waste treatment provider.5 '
Appraising the document, the court focused upon a provision designating
specified additional parcels to be included within the landfill at the
option of the provider.5 2 The court deemed that provision a "siting
decision"53 which, under the Solid Waste Management Act,54 must be
preceded by notice. 5 Rejecting defendants' proposal that the defect be
cured by a properly noticed meeting,5" the court reasoned that "[a]
public airing must precede a decision if it is to have an unbiased,
unencumbered effect on the decision." The resolution's siting decision,
the court concluded, was void.5"

to commit the act." 265 Ga. at 494, 458 S.E.2d at 628.
48, 265 Ga. at 494, 458 S.E.2d at 627. The court found the legally delegated power in
O.C.G.A. § 36-30-2, empowering municipalities to manage and dispose of their property.
265 Ga. at 494, 458 S.E.2d at 627.
49. 265 Ga. at 494, 458 S.E.2d at 628. "Given the city's potential liability, we reject the
taxpayers' argument that the illegality of the underlying notes means the city abused its
discretion in paying the claim." Id.
50. 219 Ga. App. 781, 466 S.E.2d 901 (1995).
51. Id. at 782, 466 S.E.2d at 903.
52. Id. "It constitutes mutual obligations designating specified additionalparcels for
landfilling, to be added at the option of Mid-American alone, subject to permitting and
other applicable laws for landfills." Id. at 783-84, 466 S.E.2d at 904.
53. Id. at 782, 466 S.E.2d at 903. "We reject [defendants'] argument that, because the
new property is contiguous to the existing landfill, the adoption of the agreement is not a
siting decision." Id. at 784, 466 S.E.2d at 904-05.
54. O.C.G.A. § 12.8-1 to 12-8-40.2 (1996).
55. Id. § 12-8-26(b).
56.. 219 Ga. App. at 785, 466 S.E.2d at 905. "The implicit purpose of the notice requirements is to promote reasoned decisions on the location of waste facilities made after public
discussion and to assure officials' accountability." Id.
57. Id. at 785, 468 S.E.2d at 905-06. "The score must be the result of plays made
during the game, not after its conclusion." Id., 466 S.E.2d at 906.
58. Id. at 786, 466 S.E.2d at 906. Observing, however, the presence of a severability
clause in the lease agreement, the court held other provisions ("many matters unrelated
to the illegal siting decision such as pre-existing leases, per ton host fees for solid waste,
recovery of methane gas, and indemnification") valid. Id.

428

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

E. Regulation
The adult entertainment establishment continued its levy upon
municipal regulatory attention during the survey period.69 Club
Southern Burlesque, Inc. v. City of Carrollton ° featured a constitutional
attack upon an ordinance regulating such establishments. Specifically,
challenger argued, the municipality produced insufficient evidence of
"pernicious secondary effects" to justify the ordinance."1 Rejecting that
argument, the supreme court noted plaintiff's agreement at the bench
trial to treat municipal responses to inquiries as sworn testimony. In
those responses, the city had identified several studies from other
localities supporting its conclusion on secondary effects.6 2 The court
held this unrebutted evidence 63 sufficient to authorize the trial judge's
finding "that the City relied on specific studies which it reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problems addressed by the ordinance."'
The court likewise sustained the ordinance at issue in Dudley's Food
& Spirits, Inc. v. City of College Park,65 an ordinance prohibiting "full
or substantial nudity in establishments where alcoholic beverages are
served." 6 Reviewing the familiar three-part test for constitutionality,"7 the court enumerated the items of evidence offered by the

59. For treatment of the municipal regulatory power in an assortment of contexts, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Discretion in Georgia Local Government Law, 8 GA. L. REV. 614
(1974); Reasoning by Riddle: The Power to Prohibit in Georgia Local Government Law, 9
GA. L. REV. 115 (1974); Local GovernmentLaw and LiquorLicensing: A Sobering Vignette,
15 GA. L. REV. 1039 (1981); "AscertainableStandards"v. "UnbridledDiscretion"in Local
Government Regulation, GA. COUNTY GOv'T MAG., Dec. 1989, at 19.
60. 265 Ga. 528, 457 S.E.2d 816 (1995).
61. Id. at 529, 457 S.E.2d at 818.
62. Id. at 530, 457 S.E.2d at 818. "This evidence offered by the City was not rebutted
by appellant at the bench trial. In fact, appellant put forth no evidence whatsoever." Id.
at 529-30, 457 S.E.2d at 818.
63. Id. at 531, 457 S.E.2d at 819. "Here, ... the City did produce evidence of the
specific studies that it had relied upon and evidence of its reasonable belief in the relevance
thereof." Id. at 530, 457 S.E.2d at 818.
64. Id. at 531, 457 S.E.2d at 819. Justice Sears, joined by Chief Justice Hunt,
dissented on grounds that the municipality had merely listed reports from other cities and
had failed to demonstrate that it relied upon those reports in adopting the ordinance. Id.
at 534, 457 S.E.2d at 821 (Sears, J., dissenting).
65. 265 Ga. 618, 458 S.E.2d 823 (1995).
66. Id. at 618, 458 S.E.2d at 824.
67. Id. "The ordinance must (1) further an important government interest, (2) be
unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (3) restrict speech no more than necessary to
further the government interest." Id. at 619, 458 S.E.2d at 824.
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As for studies demonstrating pernicious secondary
municipality.'
effects, "[it was not incumbent upon the city to prove the efficacy of the
studies, 0' only that it studied them and reasonably believed them
relevant.70 As for evidence that the city's motivating factor was not the
suppression of speech, "it is clear that the crime issue was on the minds
of the council members from the outset, and that it was the motivating
factor in enacting the ordinance."71

F

Openness

The mandate of public disclosure goes to both public records and
public meetings.7 2 As for the former, the Open Record Act's7" exemptions are as traditional as its disclosure requirements. One established
exemption addresses law enforcement and prosecution records; it touches
upon both "confidential information" 74 and matters part of a "pending
investigation or prosecution." 71 In Atlanta Journal & Constitution v.
City of Brunswick,6 the supreme court applied the "confidential
information" exemption to certain police department incident reports.77
The court found that the trial judge had committed no reversible error
in conducting an ex parte hearing to determine which information might
disclose a confidential source or reveal investigative matter endangering
human life.7"

68. Id.at 619, 458 S.E.2d at 824-25.
[T]he city submitted the ordinance; the minutes of the city council meeting at
which the need for such an ordinance was discussed; an Austin, Texas, study
showing a correlation between adult entertainment establishments and crime; and
statistics from an Atlanta study of criminal activity in four areas in which adult
business establishments are located.
Id.
69. Id. at 620, 458 S.E.2d at 825.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court reviewed the minutes of the council meeting to show that the Austin
study was distributed and that the municipal police chief spoke at length about the crime
factor. Id.
72. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local
Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
73. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (1994).
74. Id. § 50-18-72(a)(3).
75. Id. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
76. 265 Ga. 413, 457 S.E.2d 176 (1995).
77. Id. at 413-14, 457 S.E.2d at 176. "We granted the petitions for certiorari to
determine the extent to which records, which are otherwise non-exempt from disclosure
under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4), are exempted from disclosure under the
provisions of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(3)." 265 Ga. at 413, 457 S.E.2d at 177.
78. 265 Ga. at 414-15,457 S.E.2d at 178. "It follows that the Court of Appeals [214 Ga.
App. 150, 447 S.E.2d 41 (1994)] correctly affirmed the trial court's ruling that the incident
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G. Liability
In litigation over municipal tort liability, the basic elements of tort law
occasionally get lost in the shuffle."9 One of those elements is that of
"duty," the absence of which brought claimant to regret in Tilley v. City
of Hapeville.s° The case featured a motorist's action against a municipality and its police officer for injuries suffered when plaintiff collided
with a car parked on the highway at night."1 Rejecting plaintiff's
claims, the court of appeals emphasized that defendants had not
explicitly assured plaintiff that they would act on his behalf nor had
plaintiff detrimentally relied upon defendants' affirmative actions."
Thus, no special relationship existed between the parties, the court held,
and defendants otherwise owed no "duty" to protect individual citizens. 8

Another liability essential goes to plaintiff's conduct in the case, a
point forcefully highlighted in City of Winder v. Girone. 4 There, the
supreme court denied a tort action to a homeowner who fell while

reports are exempted from disclosure to the extent they contain the type of confidential
information specified in subsection (a)(3) of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72." 265 Ga. at 414-15, 457
S.E.2d at 178.
79. For orientation, perspective, and general chronology on municipal liability, see R.
PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"Conundrum,
2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993).
80. 218 Ga. App. 39, 459 S.E.2d 567, cert. granted.
81. Id. at 40, 459 S.E.2d at 568. Plaintiff was traveling from the municipal airport
during early morning hours, collided with a vehicle parked in the travel lane without
lights, and sued defendants for negligence in failing to warn or direct him away from the
hazard. Id.
82. Id. at 41, 459 S.E.2d at 568. These are the elements for determining "whether a
duty exists upon which a police officer or municipality may be held liable for failure to
provide police protection to an individual citizen." Id. at 40, 459 S.E.2d at 568.
83. Id. at 41, 459 S.E.2d at 569. The court affirmed the trial judge's grant of
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at 42, 459 S.E.2d at 569.
The absence of a tort duty also controlled the court of appeals' decision in the period case
of Finley v. Lehman, 218 Ga. App. 789,463 S.E.2d 709 (1995). This wrongful death action
was against a municipal engineer, present at a work site as a courtesy to see that sewer
line was being laid to municipal specifications, when an improperly shored ditch collapsed
on plaintiffs decedent. The court emphasized that the defendant had not actually
undertaken to make safety inspections of the ditch, nor had the municipality explicitly
assured that it would act on behalf of the decedent. "A private citizen does not have a
cause of action for breach of such a duty by a governmental employee in the absence of a
special relationship between the citizen and the governmental unit." Id. at 791, 463 S.E.2d
at 710-11.
84. 265 Ga. 723, 462 S.E.2d 704 (1995).
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directing cleanup operations necessitated by raw sewage spills onto her
property from the municipal sewer line."5 The court observed that "the
presence of the sewage and the slippery condition it presented were
known by [plaintiffi and she was not required to traverse the concrete
patio to get the cleaning crew to the basement.""6 Accordingly, the
court held, the plaintiff's own conduct barred her recovery 7
As for municipal tort immunity, the action to recover for a municipal
"nuisance" offers a possible exception." As evidenced by Hibbs v. City
of Riverdale, 9 however, the nuisance action carries its own baggage.
Plaintiffs in Hibbs had experienced repeated flooding of their homes;
they alleged municipal negligence in approving a faulty drainage system
and the maintenance of a resulting nuisance. 90 Turning a deaf ear to
the nuisance allegations,"1 the court of appeals emphasized the
requirement of more than mere negligence. "[Even] assuming the City
accepted the drainage system and was therefore responsible for its

85. Id. at 723, 462 S.E.2d at 704. Plaintiff alleged municipal negligence in failing to
maintain the sewer line. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 705.
86. Id. at 724-25, 462 S.E.2d at 706. Reversing the court of appeals' decision in the
case Girone v. City of Winder, 215 Ga. App. 822, 452 S.E.2d 794 (1994), the supreme court
reasoned as follows: "A property owner who comes upon a dangerous situation created by
a trespasser on the property owner's property has the same duty to exercise due care for
her personal safety as does a stranger who comes upon a dangerous situation created by
another." 265 Ga. at 724, 462 S.E.2d at 705-06.
87. ' 265 Ga. at 725, 462 S.E.2d at 706. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment for the municipality, holding that there was no jury issue in the
case. Id.
The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in the period case of Harmon v. City
of College Park, 218 Ga. App. 136, 460 S.E.2d 554 (1995), an action for an apartment
complex resident's drowning on the complex grounds in a flooded creek that was a
component of the municipal drainage system. Relying upon evidence that the decedent
attempted to walk through deep, rapidly moving water at night, in an area familiar to her,
the court held, as a matter of law, that decedent's own conduct was the "proximate cause"
of her death. With only Presiding Judge McMurray dissenting, the court affirmed the trial
judge's grant of summary judgment for the municipality. Id. at 138, 460 S.E.2d at 557.
88. For treatment of "nuisance" liability in local government law, see R. PERRY
SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MuNIcIPAL TORT LIABiLITY IN GEoRGIA 117-34 (4th ed. 1988);
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"Nuisance,12 GA. ST.
B.J. 11 (1975); Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1991).
89. 219 Ga. App. 457, 465 S.E.2d 486 (1995).
90. Id. at 457, 465 S.E.2d at 486. Plaintiffs' homes were located in a subdivision,
constructed by a developer who allegedly complied with municipal subdivision regulations.
Id.
91. Id. at 459, 465 S.E.2d at 489. The court affirmed the trial judge's grant of the
municipality's motion for summary judgment. Id.
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maintenance, the crux of the plaintiffs' complaints is negligence, 'and
negligence is insufficient to support a cause of action for nuisance."'9
Watson v. City of Atlanta9 3 illustrated yet another effort to by-pass
94
municipal tort immunity-the "inverse condenmation" exception.
Plaintiffs complained that their apartments near the municipal airport
were not treated the same as single-family dwellings there. Unlike the
latter, plaintiffs' properties were excluded from municipal purchase
under the city's "Noise, Compatibility Program."95 Alleging loss of
property values, plaintiffs sued in inverse condemnation for municipal
actions violative of equal protection." Reviewing the city Program's
stated goal of reducing land uses incompatible with airport noise, the
court pronounced the Program's classifications flawed."7 "The defect in
the classification is that it draws a line between otherwise identical
groups-residences in the vicinity of the airport-without an objective
basis for doing so." 's The court remanded the case for a new trial on

the absence of a rational relationship between goal and classification."

92. Id. at 458,465 S.E.2d at 489 (quoting City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App.
312, 316(3), 439 S.E.2d 95 (1993)).
See also the period case of City of College Park v. Pichon, 217 Ga. App. 53, 456 S.E.2d
686 (1995), in which plaintiff was successful in recovering a jury verdict for municipal
nuisance in maintaining a drainage easement, but suffered reversal on the issues of
attorney fees and litigation expenses. The court held that plaintiffs testimony alone, as
to the approximate costs of his legal fees, was an insufficient basis for the awards. Id. at
56.
93. 219 Ga. App. 704, 466 S.E.2d 229 (1995).
94. For treatment of aspects of the exception, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF
MUNIcIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 134-43 (4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local

Government Liability Limitations: "Causation"is to Tort as "PolicePower"is to Eminent
Domain, URBAN GA. 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1987).
95. 219 Ga. App. at 705, 466 S.E.2d at 231. The municipal "Program" set forth the
conclusion that multi-family units were less affected by and thus more compatible with the
noise generated by the airport. Id.
96. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that once the municipality purchased and razed the singlefamily units, their apartments were left in a "wasteland" with even more noise. "As a
result, plaintiffs contend they have been forced to lower rental rates, have experienced
lower occupancy in the units, and have been unable to sell the property." Id.
97. Id. at 706,466 S.E.2d at 232. "The City provides no competent evidence in the form
of verifiable apartment occupancy rates or verifiable statistics to prove that single-family
home owners are more affected by the noise than are multi-family renters." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 707, 466 S.E.2d at 232. "Accordingly, the trial court erred in finding that the
classification bore a rational relationship to the goal of reducing noncompatible land use
by buying those properties most affected and in granting the City summary judgment on
plaintiffs' equal protection claim," Id.
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Municipal officers and agents likewise attracted litigation during the
survey period. In Gaskins v. Hand,'"' plaintiff sued the mayor for
ordering that municipal sanitation workers could no longer take their
breaks at plaintiff's store. 10' On both counts of plaintiff's complaint,
the court of appeals reversed adverse summary judgments. As for
tortious interference with business relations, the court found questions
of fact to exist on each element of the tort.' As for statutory personal
liability, 1°' the court held that "questions exist as to whether [the
mayor] was acting within his authority or with malicious intent when he
ordered the ban on the store."1°4
Claimant enjoyed less success in Davis v. Dublin City Board of
Education, °5 an action against both school board and principal for
injuries to plaintiff who tripped on a rug and fell through a glass door.
Classifying the maintenance of facilities as discretionary in nature, the
court held the board entitled to sovereign immunity and the principal
covered by official immunity.0 6 Moreover, the court asserted, neither
of those immunities was waived by the admitted existence of liability
insurance. 107

100. 219 Ga. App. 823, 466 S.E.2d 688 (1996).
101. Id. at 824, 466 S.E.2d at 689. The order arose from an original controversy over
the city's switching to a private sanitation service and a threat by the son of the store
owner to sue the municipality. Id.
102. Id. at 825,466 S.E.2d at 690. The action sought damages under O.C.G.A. § 36-334. The court quoted the elements necessary to the tort from Valdez v. Power Indus.
Consultants, 215 Ga. App. 444, 447, 451 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1994). 219 Ga. App. at 824, 466
S.E.2d at 689.
103. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-4: "Members of the council and other officers of a municipal
corporation shall be personally liable to one who sustains special damages as the result of
any official act of such officers if done oppressively, maliciously, corruptly, or without
authority of law." For treatment of this statute specifically, and of the general issue of
official liability, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers: Rights for
Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); IndividualLiability in Georgia Local Government
Law: The HauntingHiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); Local Government
Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 405, 423 (1993).
104. 219 Ga. App. at 825, 466 S.E.2d at 690.
105. 219 Ga. App. 121, 464 S.E.2d 251 (1995).
106. Id. at 122, 464 S.E.2d at 252-53. The court relied upon the 1991 Amendment to
the Constitution, art. I, § II, para. IX. "It follows that the Board of Education is entitled
to claim sovereign immunity and the principal is entitled to official immunity from
personal liability for irjuries sustained as a result of the negligent performance of
discretionary official acts." 219 Ga. App. at 122, 464 S.E.2d at 252-53.
107. 219 Ga. App. at 123, 464 S.E.2d at 253. The court reasoned that no statute
waived sovereign immunity, in the fashion contemplated by the 1991 constitutional
amendment, for school districts that purchase liability insurance. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

434
H.

[Vol. 48

Zoning

Matters of both rezoning and variances are staples in the law of
municipal zoning. The issue in Powell v. City of Snellville'05 went to
the former: "The question is whether... the property owner... had to
file an application for rezoning with local authorities before seeking a
judicial determination of the constitutionality of the property's zoning.""' 9 Answering that question in the negative, the supreme court
emphasized that the municipality had twice rezoned plaintiffs property
over her protests, once with knowledge of pending litigation, and had
1
purposely restricted plaintiff from using the property as she desired."
To require plaintiff to go yet again before the municipality, prior to
attacking the zoning classification, would, said the court, "require a
useless act."'
The variance controversy emerged in Union City Board of Zoning
Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc.,"2 involving outdoor advertising signs. Suffering denial of a variance for those signs, plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of the municipal sign ordinance." 3 In
a lengthy opinion, the supreme court delineated the invalid portions of
the ordinance. First, the court invalidated a prohibition upon the
display of noncommercial messages at locations where commercial
1
messages were permitted."
Second, the court rejected "content
restrictions" on on-premise signs in residential districts, "namely the

108. 266 Ga. 315, 467 S.E.2d 540 (1996).
109. Id. at 315, 467 S.E.2d at 541.
110. Id. at 315-16, 467 S.E.2d at 541. Plaintiff owned an eleven acre tract of land
which she planned to sell for development as a parking facility for a shopping mall. The
municipality had twice rezoned the property over plaintiffs protests, both times imposing
a condition preventing use as a parking lot for the mall. Id.
111. Id. at 316, 467 S.E.2d at 542.
Even when there is a remedy provided by law, a court in equity will not require

pursuit of the remedy if to do so would be a futile act .... Here it is plain that
it would have been in vain for [plaintiff] to first seek an application for the
rezoning she sought.
Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's summary judgment favoring the municipality.
Id. at 317, 467 S.E.2d at 542.

112. 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996).
113. Id. at 393, 467 S.E.2d at 877. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision
affirming the zoning board's denial of a variance, but also reviewed other determinations
on constitutionality. Id.

114. Id. at 394-95, 467 S.E.2d at 878. Illustrating the defect, the court reasoned that
under the prohibition "the proprietor of a dining establishment could erect a sign

identifying 'Joe's Famous Pizza,' but could not post a sign, identical in size, color, lettering,
structure, and placement, proclaiming his view that 'abortion is murder.'" Id. at 396, 467

S.E.2d at 879.
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expression of the personal views of a resident on subjects unrelated to
the residential lot on which the sign is located."'15 Third, the court
voided a seven-week time limitation on political signs; that "durational
limitation placed on political signs does not withstand strict scrutiny,
and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on free
speech." 1 6 Finally, the court declared "unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague" a restriction on signs containing "statements, words or
pictures of an obscene, indecent or immoral character such as will offend
public morals."'17
II.

COUNTIES

A.

Officers and Employees
In local government officialdom, the writ of quo warranto serves as the
law's most prominent procedure for trying title to office. "It is no mere
coincidence that for well over seven hundred years, the common law has
characterized quo warranto as an 'extraordinary remedy.'"" 8 This
survey period featured the procedure in the context of Brown v.
Scott,19 an effort to apply the writ 120 to juvenile court "intake officers."121 These officers, also county police officers, disclaimed their
status as "public officers" subject to the writ; their argument received
short shrift from the supreme court. The court asserted that the intake
officer "has a title given by law and exercises functions concerning the
public assigned by law";" 2 "It]he mere fact that he or she may not be
entitled to all the trappings of public office does not make the office any
less public."" 2 Proceeding to subject the office to the writ, the court
promptly discovered a violation of separation of powers."2 "They

115. Id. at 399, 467 S.E.2d at 881.
116. Id. at 401, 467 S.E.2d at 882.
117. Id., 467 S.E.2d at 883. The court said this language "requires the speaker to step
outside of his or her own moral consciousness and independently determine the moral
sensibilities of the general public." Id. at 402, 467 S.E.2d at 883.
118. R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 163 (1987).
119. 266 Ga. 44, 464 S.E.2d 607 (1995).
120. O.C.G.A. § 9-6-60 (1993).
121. 266 Ga. at 45, 464 S.E.2d at 608. "A juvenile intake officer is appointed by the
judge of the juvenile court to determine whether a child who has been taken into custody
should be released or retained. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-19." 266 Ga. at 45, 464 S.E.2d at 608.
122. 266 Ga. at 45, 464 S.E.2d at 608. "This conclusion is not altered simply because
the officer's duties are narrowly confined." Id.
123. Id. (citing McDuffie v. Perkerson, 178 Ga. 230, 233(3), 173 S.E. 151 (1933)).
124. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. III.
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cannot assume and discharge the duties of law enforcement officers, an
executive function, and at the same time undertake the duties of juvenile
intake officers, a judicial function."'
Yet another frequently pursued "writ" in county law, although often
without success, is that of mandamus.'26 At least three cases in the
supreme court this year illustrated the point. A prerequisite for
mandamus, declared missing in Thompson v. Paulk,2 7 is the unavailability of a legal remedy.12 Although the court recognized that a
county jail detainee was entitled to records of his mental health
treatment, 29 it held petitioner deficient
in failing to avail himself of
130
the sheriff's established procedures.
Additionally, a mandamus petitioner must demonstrate a clear legal
right to the relief sought. 3' This snare operated to foreclose petitioner's action in Brooks v. Clayton County Board of Commissionersi. a

court reporter's effort to force payment of alleged travel and contingent
expenses." A similar disposition befell a county jail inmate in Grant

125.

266 Ga. at 46, 464 S.E.2d at 609. "To rule otherwise, would permit youth squad

officers who are serving as juvenile intake officers to review the facts and conclusions
reached by their fellow officers. This is a function they cannot be expected to do with
neutrality and impartiality." Id. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's issuance of quo
warranto. Id. at 46-47, 464 S.E.2d at 609.
126. See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw 131-32 (1989).
For those who simply enjoy "law watching," the view of mandamus' evolution is
nothing short of spectacular. For those intimately concerned with local
government law, however, the panorama is a bit more disquieting; an inordinate
amount of their time and energy is going into bringing and defending mandamus
actions. Given modern concerns with legal economy and efficiency, perhaps the
bench would do well to counsel caution over this litigational waste. Counsel would
do even better to heed that caution.

Id.
127. 265 Ga. 479, 457 S.E.2d 665 (1995).
128. Id. at 479, 457 S.E.2d at 665. "Mandamus is available only when the petitioner
.. lacks an adequate legal remedy." Id.

129, Id. "[The sheriff] concedes that [petitioner] has a right to the records under
O.C.G.A. § 37-3-167(a)." 265 Ga. at 479, 457 S.E.2d at 665.
130. 265 Ga. at 479, 457 S.E.2d at 665. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's grant
of summary judgment to the sheriff. Id. at 480, 457 S.E.2d at 665.
131. R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., MISCASTING MANDAMUS IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 33-41 (1989).
132. 265 Ga. 482, 458 S.E.2d 355 (1995).
133. Id. at 482, 458 S.E.2d at 355. The trial court had found that petitioner "had not
shown a clear legal right to the relief she sought from the Board," and the supreme court
affirmed denial of her petition. Id.
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v. Byrd"3 who desired corrected documents from the Superior Court
Clerk indicating petitioner's incarceration time.'

In Murray County School District u. Adams,'36 the court of appeals

considered a challenge by county school employees to the school board's
terminating the employer matching portion of an annuity retirement
savings plan.'37 Delineating the item for analysis, the court focused
upon the "Retirement Savings Plan," not the "Plan Design" attached to
as the controlling document. Under that
the board's minutes,'
authority to "terminate the Plan at
possessed
the
employer
document,
any time." 39 Accordingly, the court held, the employees "never
right in the benefits," 40 and the employer was free
acquired a property
4
'
to terminate.1

B. Power
Whether a county possesses a given power frequently turns upon an
analysis of the "state v. local government" hierarchy. The survey period
presented an apt illustration of that analysis in DeKalb County Board
of Health v. Lee. 42 There, the issue posed went to whether the county
134. 265 Ga. 684, 461 S.E.2d 871 (1995).
135. Id. at 684, 461 S.E.2d at 871. "Because the clerk had no duty to compute or give
credit for the time [petitioner] spent confined in the county jail, his petition shows no
justiciable issue for which the trial court could grant relief against the clerk." Id. at 685,
461 S.E.2d at 872.
136. 218 Ga. App. 220, 461 S.E.2d 228 (1995).
137. Id. at 220, 461 S.E.2d at 228. The school board had instituted the tax-sheltered
annuity program in 1989 as a substitute for Social Security coverage for its employees; the
board terminated its contribution in 1991. Id
138. Id. at 222, 461 S.E.2d at 231. "The plan design is not 'the fringe benefit package';
it is merely a summary of the plan in outline form." Id. at 233, 461 S.E.2d at 231.
139. Id. "We therefore hold that the plan that became part of the employees' contracts
... itself provided for future modification and/or termination at the discretion of the
employer." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court thus reversed the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
employees. Id.
Yielding yet another unfavorable "benefits" decision, the supreme court, in Belk v.
Westbrooks, 266 Ga.628, 469 S.E.2d 149 (1996), rejected the challenge of rural volunteer
firefighters in a "Class 9" system to a state statute limiting pensions to firefighters in
departments rated "Class 8" or better. Holding the statute rationally related to the
legitimate objective of inducing fire suppression systems to upgrade their facilities, the
court concluded as follows: "The inability of individual appellants to persuade local
government jurisdictions which they serve to expend tax revenues authorized for purpose
of fire protection... does not render constitutionally infirm the inducement selected by the
legislature nor does the decision by the legislature not to mandate such expenditures at
local levels." Id. at 629-30, 469 S.E.2d at 151.
142. 266 Ga. 507, 467 S.E.2d 564 (1996).
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could establish qualifications for persons who install and repair septic
tanks.' 43 That issue depended, in turn, upon whether such work fell
within the state statute's definition of "plumbing"'" so as to preempt
county power. 145 Responding in the negative, the supreme court
construed the statute to cover "work on piping fixtures and other
materials from a residence to the septic tank."46 However, this did
not include "installing, maintaining, or repairing the septic tank
itself." 47 Accordingly, the court decided, state law did not preempt
county power to regulate the work. 1'
A variation on the hierarchy theme surfaced in the face-off featured
by Floyd County Grand Jury v. Department of Family & Children
Services.149 The case involved the county grand jury's power to
subpoena county Department of Family and Children Services ("DFACS") employees as a part of the former's authority to conduct civil
inspections and investigations of county offices. 5 ' In reviewing the
issue, the court of appeals examined the statute empowering grand jury
investigations'5 1 and statutes dealing particularly with DFACS. 5 2
On the basis of that examination,"5 5 the court concluded that county
departments of family and children services "are state rather than
county offices," 54 and "not subject to the grand jury's power of inspection and investigation." 55
143. Id. at 507, 467 S.E.2d at 565. The trial court had enjoined the county from
enforcing its requirements. Id.
144. O.C.G.A. § 43-14-2(12) (1994).
145. 266 Ga. at 507, 467 S.E.2d at 565. "Unless the installation and repair of septic
tanks are included in the statutory definition of plumbing, counties may establish the
qualifications of persons who do that work." Id.
146. Id. at 508, 467 S.E.2d at 566.
147. Id.
148. Id. The court thus reversed the trial court's actions in the case. Id.
149. 218 Ga. App. 832, 463 S.E.2d 519 (1995).
150, Id. at 833, 463 S.E.2d at 520 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71(b)(2) (1994)).
151. Id. "[The grand jury shall, whenever deemed necessary by eight or more of its
members, appoint a committee of its members to inspect or investigate any county office
.. ," Id.

152. E.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 49-2-1 to 49-4-17 (1994). "Not only are county departments of
family and children services under the supervision of DHR, a state agency, but Georgia law
suggests that DFACS employees are state employees." 218 Ga. App. at 833, 463 S.E.2d at
521.
153. 218 Ga. App. at 834, 463 S.E.2d at 521. As for annual county contributions to the
DFACS program, the court observed that no county is required to participate in the cost
of such programs and "therefore, any contribution by [the county] to DFACS is voluntary."
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 835,463 S.E.2d at 521. "Consequently, the trial court properly quashed the
subpoenas." Id.
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C. Regulation
As with municipalities, the control of adult entertainment establishments likewise consumed county regulatory efforts during the survey
period. In reviewing those efforts, the supreme court cut a distinctive
analytical path. Parker v. Whitfield County5 ' encompassed attacks
against an ordinance which licensed adult establishments and created
a "buffer" between nude dancers and patrons.' 57 Rejecting the challenges, the court held that the county need not prove the efficacy of
studies it relied upon from other communities; it need only show reliance
upon specific evidence of pernicious secondary effects reasonably believed
relevant." s As for the "buffer" provisions, 5 9 the court asserted that
"[an ordinance can pass constitutional muster even though it has a
somewhat negative impact on protected expression. " 16° This measure,
the court found, furthered the governmental interests in reducing crime
and neighborhood deterioration.'
Finally, the court viewed the
ordinance's licensing standards as "clear and appropriate"; 2 they did
not "vest the decisionmaker with unfettered discretion."' 6 3
Subsequent to sustaining the county's defensive posture in Parker,the
court assessed a government's offensive burden in regulating adult
establishments. Chambers v. Peach County' featured the county's
attempted enforcement of its nude dancing ordinance, with defendant
raising constitutional objections.'"
The supreme court's initial

156. 265 Ga. 829, 463 S.E.2d 116 (1995).
157. Id. at 829, 463 S.E.2d at 116. Plaintiff owned a nude dancing establishment; he
argued that the county's evidence of increased criminal activity and deterioration of
neighborhoods was insufficient to justify the ordinance. Id. at 829, 463 S.E.2d at 117.
158. Id. at 829-30,463 S.E.2d at 117. 'The evidence offered by the county satisfied that
burden." Id. at 830, 463 S.E.2d at 117.
159. E.g., a stage of minimum height, minimum distance requirements, full lighting of
the premises, and prohibition of the sale of alcoholic beverages. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Here, said the court, "the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than
necessary to further the government interests." Id.
162. Id. at 831, 463 S.E.2d at 118.
163. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the trial judge's denial of plaintiff's challenge, Id.
164. 266 Ga. 318, 467 S.E.2d 519 (1996).
165. Id. at 318, 467 S.E.2d at 519. The county sought to permanently enjoin the
operation of defendant's establishment, and the trial judge granted the county's motion for
summary judgment. In review, the supreme court noted that "[als movant for summary
judgment, [the county] has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact
remained concerning the ordinance's purpose as an effort to deal with adverse secondary
effects." Id. at 319-20, 467 S.E.2d at 522.
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focus' went to "the county's effort to establish that its ordinance was
passed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit
businesses." 67 Immediately, the court encountered a problem: the
ordinance included only a statement of "purpose"; it did "not state that
it is relying on the experience of other governing bodies in enacting this
ordinance." " '

As for the commission chairman's affidavit including

copies of other governmental studies, 69 that evidence "misses the
mark."'70 In the absence of a showing that "before passing the
ordinance," the county relied upon such studies, "the ordinance
7'
regulating expressive conduct cannot pass constitutional muster."
17 2
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial judge's decision of validity.
D. Openness
The survey period's issue of county "openness" went to the matter of
"open records," more specifically to the issue of charges imposed by
county custodians for providing those records. 73 That issue arose in
Powell v. VonCanon,7 the demand by a seller of compiled real estate
records that county record custodians give him the necessary copies. 7 '

166. Id. at 320, 467 S.E.2d at 522. "Thus, before the ordinance is put to the Paramount
Picturesthree-pronged test reserved for content-neutral legislation, it must be established
that the ordinance is designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of sexually
explicit businesses." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 321, 467 S.E.2d at 522.
The... ordinance's statement of purpose is not evidence of undesirable secondary
effects upon which the county could rely in enacting the ordinance and it does not
show that, in enacting the ordinance, the county relied on evidence reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problems of increased crime and neighborhood
deterioration.
Id. at 320, 467 S.E.2d at 522.
169. Id. at 321, 467 S.E.2d at 523. This affidavit had been attached to the county's
motion for summary judgment, with the chairman stating that the commission had "relied
on legal advice and intended to enact a constitutionally valid ordinance, and concluded
from his review of the accompanying studies of secondary effects that the studies were
consistent with the purpose and goal of (the county] ordinance." Id.
170. Id.
171.

Id.

172. Id. "Consequently, the trial court erred when it found the ordinance constitutional
and authorized the county to enforce it against appellant." Id.
173. For background, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Omen of "Openness" in Local
Government Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 97 (1978).
174. 219 Ga. App. 840, 467 S.E.2d 193 (1996).
175. Id. at 840, 467 S.E.2d at 193. Plaintiff was in the business of compiling public real
estate records and then selling that information via a computer network. He brought this
action for records against a county commissioner, the county tax commissioner, the county
tax assessor, and the county superior court clerk. Id.
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Reviewing the Open Records Act,17 the court of appeals held that a
county commissioner, the tax commissioner, and the tax assessor were
limited as to the charges they could impose.'77 The court delineated,
however, in respect to "the ability of superior court clerks to contract to
market records of their offices for profit." 7 ' This power devolved from
a statute enacted subsequent to the Open Records Act, a statute the
court interpreted to prevail over that Act.'79 Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial judge's decision limiting the amounts the Superior
Court Clerk could charge the plaintiff for reproducing the requested
computerized information.8 0

E. Finances
Again this year, the supreme court rather routinely rejected an
"indebtedness" challenge to a local bond issue.' 8 ' Reed v. State 82
featured an arrangement between the local impoundment authority and
the county to fund a surface water impoundment facility via the
authority's issuance of bonds. The challenge to the arrangement went
to the county's agreeing "to make payments to the Authority sufficient

176. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 to 50-18-76 (1994).
177. 219 Ga. App. at 841, 467 S.E.2d at 194. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(d) provides that
a reasonable charge may be collected for search, retrieval, and other direct
administrative costs for complying with a request .... The hourly charge shall
not exceed the salary of the lowest paid full-time employee who, in the discretion
of the custodian of the records, has the necessary skill and training to perform the
request ....

178. 219 Ga. App. at 842, 467 S.E.2d at 194.
179. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-96:
The clerk of the superior court is the custodian of the records of his or her office.
Any contract to distribute, sell, or otherwise market records or computer
generated data of the office of the clerk of the superior court for profit shall be
made by the clerk of the superior court.
The court held that the two statutes "may be reconciled by giving recognition to the last
stated statute." 219 Ga. App. at 841, 467 S.E.2d at 194. For discussion of the appellate
use of legislative history in this and other contexts, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia
Statutory Construction: The Use of Legislative History, April 1996 GA. B.J. 30 (1996).
180. 219 Ga. App. at 840, 467 S.E.2d at 194. Moreover, the court reasoned, this result
did not contravene the "overall purpose" of the Open Records Act: the real estate records
in issue were required to be printed for public inspection no less than every 30 days;
"Allowing the [county] superior court clerk to contract to earn a profit by providing a
computer disk or tape containing this already public information in no way limits public
access to the information." Id. at 841, 467 S.E.2d at 194.
181. For last year's entry, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 47 MERCER
L. REV. 225, 253 (1995), treating Clayton County Airport Auth. v. State, 265 Ga. 24, 453
S.E.2d 8 (1995).
182. 265 Ga. 458, 458 S.E.2d 113 (1995).
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Affirming the bond validation order, the court
to pay the bonds."'
asserted that "the county has not pledged its faith and credit to pay the
bonds, but has entered into an intergovernmental contract, which it is
authorized to do by the Constitution of Georgia. " I As long as the
purpose of the contract was one authorized by the constitution," 5 the
of providing revenue
court concluded, the arrangement "is a valid means
6
to the Authority to be used to pay the bonds."'8
On a distinctly different financial facet, C.W. Matthews Contracting
8 7 involved a county's power to impose a local option tax
Co. v. Collins"
on equipment purchased in another county where the state sales tax was
paid. The equipment owner relied upon a statute excluding from the
local option tax a transaction not subject to the state tax.'" Because
no state tax was due on the equipment in the county where it was later
used (the tax having been paid in the county of purchase), the owner
contested that county's local option tax. Reading the statutory exclusion
in pari materia with related statutes," 9 the court rejected the owner's
position.'o Indeed, the court reasoned, under that position "only the
county where the taxpayer purchased the subject property could ever
impose a local option tax, because the state would assess the one-time
state sales and use tax in that county alone."' 19
Completing the financial cycle, Poythress v. Wilkins 92 dealt with
county collection of service assessments on spaces in mobile home

183. Id. at 459, 458 S.E.2d at 114. Intervenor contended "that the intergovernmental
contract between the Authority and [the county], in which [the county] promises to make
payments to the Authority sufficient to pay the bonds, violates the local act creating the
Authority" and providing that the county "shall not pledge its faith and credit for payment
of the bonds." Id.
184. Id.
185. GA. CONST. art. IX, § III, para. I.
186. 265 Ga. at 459, 458 S.E.2d at 115.
187. 265 Ga. 448, 457 S.E.2d 171 (1995).
188. O.C.G.A. § 48-8-82 (1995).
189, For extensive treatment and analysis of in pari materia statutory interpretation
in Georgia, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN GEORGIA: THE
DOCTRINE OF IN PAr MATERIA (1996).
190. 265 Ga. at 449, 457 S.E.2d at 172. This was mandated, the court asserted, "when
that code section is read and considered together with the related statutes in the
remainder of Chapter 8 of Title 48." Id.
191. Id. at 450,457 S.E.2d at 172. "Section 48-8-90, however, clearly contemplates that
more than one local taxing jurisdiction may impose a local option tax. ... " Id. The court
thus affirmed the court of appeals' decision against the equipment owner in 213 Ga. App.
109, 444 S.E.2d 100 (1994).

192. 218 Ga. App. 475, 462 S.E.2d 423 (1995).

1996]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

443

parks.19
Upon demand of park owners for authority, the county
14
tendered a resolution levying assessments on "dwelling units."'
Appraising the stand-off, the court of appeals held that the resolution
could not authorize assessments on "spaces ... on which mobile homes

are located as well as the mobile home itself." 9 ' "By definition," the
court asserted, "a mobile home is an item of personal property separate
That real
and apart from the real property on which it sits.""
or
dwelling,
considered
a
residence,
property "can in no way be
197
residential or dwelling unit."
F

Property
Local government property rights give rise to conflicting claims and
can make for hard-fought litigation. Wilcox County School District v.
Sutton 9 presented the claim that a county school board had abandoned property (land and building) originally deeded to it by a municipality. 9' The school board's contested action was its decision to
demolish the building as a part of a new school construction plan. Did
that decision trigger a provision in the 1950 deed that the property
would revert to the city "if ... abandoned for school purposes"?"' The
supreme court reversed the trial judge's submission of the abandonment
issue to a jury.2 ' Emphasizing evidence that the land continued to
serve as a part of the campus of the consolidated county school complex,

193. Id. at 475, 462 S.E.2d at 423. The annual assessments were for funding fire
protection and solid waste management services in established districts of the county. Id.,
462 S.E.2d at 424.
194. Id. at 476, 462 S.E.2d at 424,
195. Id, "To the contrary, the terms 'residential units' and 'dwelling units' refer to
mobile homes by their plain and ordinary meaning." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. "Consequently, the taxing authorities are not authorized to enforce the
assessments at issue against plaintiffs under the resolutions as worded." Id.
198. 265 Ga. 720, 461 S.E.2d 868 (1995).
199. Id. at 720, 461 S.E.2d at 868. The controversy arose via objections to a school
construction plan by residents and taxpayers of the county; it was brought against the
school district and county school officials. Id.
200. Id., 461 S.E.2d at 869. Preliminarily, the court held that a 1900 deed of the
property to the municipality itself did not create a trust; "(ilt merely conveyed the property
to the City and specified the purpose for which it was being conveyed." Id. at 721, 461
S.E.2d at 870,
201. Id. at 722, 461 S.E.2d at 870. "The trial court's holding that there is a question
for jury trial was error because the evidence demands the conclusion that the property has
not been 'abandoned for school purposes."' Id.
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the court held there had been no abandonment of the property "for
school purposes."20 2

G. Liability
Liability litigation against counties, their officers, agents, and
employees maintained its frantic pace of the last several years.0 3
Supplementing last year's major contribution on current county
responsibility, 20 4 the supreme court added its opinion in Woodard v.
Laurens County.0 5 There, plaintiffs alleged injury in an intersection
collision caused by the county's, and its agents', negligent maintenance
of a stop sign.2 ' A unanimous court held that, under the 1991
constitutional amendment,2 7 the county enjoyed sovereign immunity.
Moreover, unless the legislature had expressly so provided, that
immunity was unaffected by liability insurance.0' The court agreed
that this scheme denied county tort victims equal treatment with those
having claims against the state. 209 However, "[a] waiver of sovereign
immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that

202. Id. "In the context of a deed such as is being considered here, 'school purposes'
means 'any activity that is necessary in the proper maintenance and operation of a school
under our present school system." Id. (quoting Board of Educ. of Appling County v.
Hunter, 190 Ga. 767(2), 10 S.E.2d 749 (1940)).
203. For perspective, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., GeorgiaLocal Government Tort Liability:
The "Crisis"Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985); Local Government Tort Liability:
The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405 (1993); Georgia Local Government Officers:
Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REV. 747 (1979); Individual Liability in Georgia Local
Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988).
204. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994), treated in R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 47 MERCER L. REV. 225, 255 (1995).
205. 265 Ga. 404, 456 S.E.2d 581 (1995).
206. Id. at 404, 456 S.E.2d at 581. Plaintiffs' vehicle struck a truck broadside which
had failed to obey a stop sign at the intersection. Id.
207. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX.
208. 265 Ga. at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 582. The court observed that under O.C.G.A. § 3324-51(b), the legislature had expressly provided for governmental waiver of tort immunity
to the extent of liability insurance for accidents arising from the use of motor vehicles (see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort Liability Insurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24
MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973)), but emphasized the inapplicability of that statute here
"because the liability of appellees is not predicated upon their alleged negligent use of an
insured motor vehicle." 265 Ga. at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 583.
209. 265 Ga. at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 583.
Plaintiffs with tort claims against the state itself have the benefit of the broad
waiver of sovereign immunity afforded by the [Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A.
§§ 50-21-20 to 50-21-37] whereas O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) waives the sovereign
immunity of a county only as to tort claims which arise out of the alleged
negligent use of an insured motor vehicle.
265 Ga. at 405, 456 S.E.2d at 583.
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privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace."210 The court thus
affirmed summary judgments favoring the county, its commissioners,
and two employees in their official capacities.2 '
Closely tracking Woodard, the court of appeals dealt, in Long v. Hall
2" with a charge
County Board of Commissioners,
of county negligence

in permitting the escape of a jail inmate.21 Alleging injury from the
escapee's negligent driving of a stolen vehicle, plaintiff also established
coverage by liability insurance." 4 The court posited the 1991 constitutional amendment as the source of the county commissioners' immunity,21 an immunity unaffected "by the mere purchase of insurance
coverage."21 ' The court discounted the legislatively authorized insurance waiver for claims arising from the county's use of a motor
vehicle.1 7 In this case, the court delineated, the commissioners'
charged liability "is not 21
predicated
upon their alleged negligent use of an
8
insured motor vehicle."

210.

265 Ga. at 406, 456 S.E.2d at 583 (citing Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115,

117(2), 274 S.E.2d 464 (1981)). The court said that "discrimination in the grant of
privileges is not a denial of equal protection to those who are not favored." Id. (citing
Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148(2)(b), 129 S.E. 861 (1925)).
211. Id. at 407, 456 S.E.2d at 584. As to the two county employees sued in their
individual capacities, the court held that under the 1991 amendment, there was immunity
for discretionary functions and that the alleged inadequate maintenance of the stop sign
constituted a discretionary act. Id. Thus, summary judgment was appropriate in these
instances as well.
In the period case of Swan v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 450, 465 S.E.2d 684 (1995),
involving a claim for the death of a child in a swimming pool owned by a "unified
government," the court of appeals rejected plaintiffs argument that the governmental
entity was neither the state nor a department or agency of the state. Rather, the court
held, under the express language of the unified government's charter, the government
"shall follow the law and rules of tort liability applicable to Counties in Georgia." Id. at
452, 465 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting 1990 Ga. Laws 3614). With that, the court applied the
supreme court's decision in Woodard to the case and held the government immune from
liability. Id., 465 S.E.2d at 687.
212. 219 Ga. App. 853, 467 S.E.2d 186 (1996).
213. Id. at 853,457 S.E.2d at 186. The inmate escaped from a minimum security work
detail, stole a truck, and collided with plaintiffs. They sued both the county commissioners
and the county correctional institute. The court viewed these defendants as covered by the
same legal principles. Id.
214. Id. Defendants admitted the existence of the insurance. Id. at 854, 467 S.E.2d
at 188.
215. GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX.
216. 219 Ga. App. at 856, 467 S.E.2d at 189.
217. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b) (1996).
218. 219 Ga. App. at 857, 467 S.E.2d at 190. Thus, "the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment to the ... County Board of Commissioners and the county Correctional
Institute." Id.
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In an effort to avoid immunity, claimant in Gwinnett County v.

King219 hoisted a civil rights action under section 1983.220 Plaintiff
alleged illegal denial of credit for time served in, and improper
sesn
I assessing
termination from, the county's work release program. 221 In
those claims, the court of appeals observed that section 1983 does not
subject local governments to respondeat superior liability.222 Rather,
"it must be shown that some policy of [the) County was responsible for
the violation of [plaintiff's] federally protected rights." 223 Plaintiff
county "policy," the court awarded summary
having identified no such
224
county.
the
to
judgment
Reflecting the rich diversity of liability litigation, Gwinnett County v.
Yates 225 focused upon the issue of attorney fees. A superior court clerk
hired private counsel to establish his freedom from coverage by the
county's merit system.22 On his subsequent claim for attorney fees,
the supreme court reasoned as follows:
[W]here ... an official, acting in his official capacity, is required to hire
outside counsel to assert a legal position the local government attorney
cannot (because of a conflict in representing the local government) or
will not assert, and the official is successful in asserting his or her
227
position, the local government must pay the official's attorney fees.

219. 218 Ga. App. 800, 463 S.E.2d 511 (1995).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). For treatment of this statute by both federal and state
courts, in respect to Georgia local governments, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW'S ASSIMILATION OF MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEw "PERSONS"

(1984).
221. 218 Ga. App. 800, 463 S.E.2d 511 (1995). Consequently, plaintiff urged, he had
been unconstitutionally detained in the county correctional institute. He sued the county
and prison officials. Id. at 800-01, 463 S.E.2d at 512.
222. Id. at 802, 463 S.E.2d at 513.
223. Id.
224. Id. As for the prison officials, the court found that plaintiff had established no
right to have credit for time served, and thus defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity. Id.
225. 265 Ga. 504, 458 S.E.2d 791 (1995).
226. Id. at 504, 458 S.E.2d at 791. Plaintiff contended that the merit board had no
jurisdiction over his dismissal of an employee, requested the county attorney assigned to
him to make that argument and, upon the attorney's refusal to do so, hired private counsel
to file a declaratory judgment action. The court decided that the clerk of the superior court
was not subject to the county merit system. Id.
227. Id. at 508, 458 S.E.2d at 795. The court explained that "[t]his is not because of
any bad faith or improper conduct on the part of... the county. Rather, attorney fees in
this instance are simply an expense of government operation." Id. at 508-09, 458 S.E.2d
at 795.
Dissenting, Presiding Justice Benham found that the superior court clerk was
constrained by the county merit system and was thus not entitled to attorney fees. More
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In several cases, the liability focus fell primarily upon county officers.
On two occasions, the court of appeals applied the "ministerial-discretionary" dichotomy, turning official immunity upon the nonmalicious
performance of "discretionary functions." The court worked that analysis
in Bitterman v. Atkins'2 upon a county school principal charged with
negligently supervising the installation of lockers.22 "The principal's
responsibility was within his discretionary duties, and as such, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity acts to shield them in the absence of

evidence that they were wilful, malicious, or corrupt."' 0

A similar

approach yielded a similar result in Teston v. Collins,2"' an action
against county school officials for injuries arising out of a student's
altercation with a school visitor.2"2 Again the court reasoned that
"absent any allegation that the individual school officials and employees
exercised their discretion with actual malice or actual intent to cause
injury to [plaintiff], we hold that they were all cloaked with official
immunity." 233

generally, however, Justice Benham was "troubled by the majority's approval of county
officials filing suits in their official capacities (other than suits filed in the regular course
of business, e.g., tax forfeitures) and then turning to the county's governing authority for
payment of attorney fees expended pursuing the unauthorized litigation." Id. at 513, 458
S.E.2d at 798 (Benham, P.J., dissenting).
In a remaining case of the period, turning upon provisions of a municipal-county sewer
agreement and thus of limited significance, the court of appeals held the agreement to
establish a joint enterprise, with each party jointly and severally liable for the acts of the
other, notwithstanding their agreement between themselves as to how control over the
sewer would be exercised. DeKalb County v. Lenowitz, 218 Ga. App. 884, 463 S.E.2d 539
(1995).
228. 217 Ga. App. 652, 458 S.E.2d 688 (1995).
229. Id. at 652, 458 S.E.2d at 688. The lockers were of a free-standing design, one of
which fell on the plaintiff student. Id.
230. Id. at 654-55, 458 S.E.2d at 691. "Although the principal was primarily
responsible for ordering the new lockers .... he was not responsible for their installation."
Id. at 654, 458 S.E.2d at 691. The court thus reversed the trial judge's denial of the
principal's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 655, 458 S.E.2d at 691.
231. 217 Ga. App. 829, 459 S.E.2d 452 (1995).
232. Id. at 829, 459 S.E.2d at 452. The altercation occurred between a student in a
shop class and a visitor to that class. Plaintiffs sued the superintendent of the school
board, the school principal, and a teacher. Id.
233. Id. at 831,459 S.E.2d at 454. "Official immunity protects individual public agents
from personal liability for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official
authority, and done without wilfulness, malice or corruption." Id. at 830, 459 S.E.2d at
454. The court termed the manner in which the teacher supervised his class as
discretionary, and likewise the actions of the superintendent and principal in reporting the
incident and seeking medical care for the student. As for the latter, these were "purely
discretionary because they entailed examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions,
and acting on them in a way not specifically directed." Id. at 831, 459 S.E.2d at 454.
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Finally, the supreme court visited the current source of "official
immunity"-the constitutional amendment of 1991 2 4--and resolved a
novel issue. Under that amendment, public officers are liable "for
injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent
to cause injury in the performance of their official functions."43 In
Merrow v. Hawkins,2 plaintiff argued "actual malice" to mean
"reckless disregard" of life or safety, the same meaning attributed to the
term in other legal contexts.8 7
The supreme court could scarcely have been more deliberate: "We
granted an interlocutory appeal in this case of first impression to
construe the meaning of the term 'actual malice' as it is used in the
context of official immunity." '23 Acknowledging but discarding the
"reckless disregard" connotation derived from defamation law,2 9 the
court took solace in criminal law's distinction between "actual" and
"implied" malice. There, it was the latter-"implied malice"-that bore
the construction of "reckless disregard."24 Because the 1991 amendment specified the term "actual malice," the court reasoned that it

In a similar vein, see the period case of Wright v. Ashe, 220 Ga. App. 91, 469 S.E.2d 268
(1996), a mother's action against county school district officials for her child's death in an
automobile accident while truant. Reasoning that "the general task imposed on teachers
to monitor, supervise, and control students has.., been held to be a discretionary action,"
the court concluded that "the defendants' acts in this case were discretionary in nature, not
ministerial. Thus, they are entitled to the protection afforded by the doctrine of official
immunity." 220 Ga. App. at 94, 469 S.E.2d at 271.
para. IX.
234. GA. CONST. art. I, § II,
235. Id.
236. 266 Ga. 390,467 S.E.2d 336(1996). The case featured an action against a county
jailer who entrusted his car to an inmate who then collided with plaintiff. Plaintiff invoked
the constitutional amendment, charging that defendant had acted "with actual malice or
with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of [his] official functions." Id. at 391,
467 S.E.2d at 337 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § II, para. IX). The trial court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id.
237. Id. The trial judge relied upon Sparks v. Thurmond, 171 Ga. App. 138, 140, 319
S.E.2d 46 (1984), superseded by statute as stated in Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 467
S.E.2d 336 (1996) "a slander case in which 'actual malice' was equated with reckless
conduct...." 266 Ga. at 391,467 S.E.2d at 337. For specific treatment of defamation law
in the local government context, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Defamation in Georgia Local
Government Law: A BriefHistory, 16 GA. L. REV. 627 (1982).
238. 266 Ga. at 390-91, 467 S.E.2d at 337.
239. Id. at 392, 467 S.E.2d at 338. "That definition, which is unique to constitutional
libel law, is inapposite here." Id.
240. Id. "Express or actual malice, although not a term typically used in the context
of civil litigation, ... is found in criminal law and has long been distinguished from
'implied malice,' a term which has been defined to mean conduct exhibiting a 'reckless
disregard for human life."' Id.
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"requires a deliberate intention to do wrong."24' After Merrow, therefore, only a showing of "deliberate intention," will pierce the county
officer's "official immunity" for his "official fumctions."'2

H. Zoning
County zoning is typically implemented by a county zoning ordinance.
In a county's effort to enforce its zoning, the fact of the zoning ordinance's existence is essential to the proceeding. This was the lesson of
Childers v. Richmond County,24s a county's action to enjoin defendant's
mobile home moving business on property zoned for agricultural
purposes. 24 In reversing the trial judge's award of injunctive relief,
the supreme court scored the county's failure to introduce its zoning
ordinance into evidence.245 On grounds that "judicial notice cannot be
taken ... of ... county ordinances,"246 the court excused defendant

from an order "to247comply with the terms of an ordinance not properly
before the court."
As for the zoning ordinance itself, Jackson v. Spalding County248
focused upon a provision specifying certiorari as the method of appealing
the zoning board's denial of a variance. 249 The supreme court rejected

241. Id. at 391, 467 S.E.2d at 337.
242. "The parties agree that [defendant] was exercising a discretionary power when he
gave the car keys to [the inmate]. Thus, [defendant] is entitled to official immunity unless
he acted with 'actual malice,' as that term is used in the 1991 amendment ..." Id. The
court concluded that "[tihe record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that [defendant]
acted with actual malice. It follows that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion
for summary judgment." Id. at 392-93, 467 S.E.2d at 338.
243. 266 Ga. 276, 467 S.E.2d 176 (1996).
244. Id. at 276, 467 S.E.2d at 176. The county also charged defendant with illegally
maintaining more than one mobile home on the property. Id.
245. Id. at 277, 467 S.E.2d at 177. "Upon our review of the record in this case, it is
apparent that the... County comprehensive zoning ordinance which the county sought to
enforce and which the trial court purported to apply, was not introduced into evidence."
Id.
246. Id. (quoting Leger v. Ken Edwards Enterprises, 223 Ga. 536, 539(2), 156 S.E.2d
651 (1967)).
247. Id. The county fared no better in the period case of Hixon v. Walker County, 266
Ga. 641,468 S.E.2d 744 (1996), as it sought to justify denial of a building permit by relying
only upon the "purpose" statement of its land regulations. On grounds that "those
'Purpose' sections set forth only a statement of general goals and purposes, without
providing any criteria to govern the consideration of an application for a building permit,"
the supreme court reversed the trial judge's refusal to issue a mandamus to the applicants.
266 Ga. at 642, 468 S.E.2d at 744-45.
248. 265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995).
249. Id. at 792,462 S.E.2d at 361. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a variance from the
zoning ordinance's requirement in respect to roof pitches on manufactured homes and then
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the property owners' argument that "certiorari is improper because the
zoning board does not exercise judicial powers."' ° Overruling one of
its own decisions,251 the court held "that a county ordinance may
specify certiorari as the method for judicial review because a [zoning]
board exercises judicial powers when it rules on a variance application."252 More specifically, the court elaborated, "the board of appeals
functioned as an administrative body making a quasi-judicial decision
when it acted on the variance application."2" In any event, the court
sustained the zoning ordinance's choice of certiorari over mandamus as
the appropriate procedural vehicle of review."'
A valid appeal from a county zoning decision may turn not only upon
method, but upon the interest of the appellant as well. This was the
issue of Macon-Bibb County Planning& Zoning Commission v. Vineville
Neighborhood Assn,25 a neighborhood association's challenge to a
Reviewing the two-step substantial
county rezoning decision. 2"

challenged the ordinance's certiorari prescription as an unconstitutional method of appeal.
Id.
250. Id. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 363. The court did not dispute the property owners'
argument that certiorari required judicial powers: "O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 provides that the writ
of certiorari is available to correct errors committed 'by any inferior judicatory or any
person exercising judicial powers." 265 Ga. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
251. International Funeral Servs., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 244 Ga. 707,261 S.E.2d 625
(1979), overruled in part by Jackson v. Spalding County, 265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361
(1995). "We overrule the InternationalFuneralopinion to the extent it suggests that a
county may not prescribe certiorari as a remedy for reviewing a zoning board's denial of
a variance." 265 Ga. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
252. 265 Ga. at 793, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
253. Id. at 794, 462 S.E.2d at 363-64. The court reasoned that
a board of zoning appeals considers whether the facts applying to a specific piece
of property warrant relief from zoning under the standards set in the county
ordinance. This decision-making process is akin to a judicial act: the board
determines the facts and applies the ordinance's legal standards to them.
Id. at 793-94, 462 S.E.2d at 363. Additionally, the court held that in this case "the board
conducted fair hearings that afforded the property owners due process." Id. at 795, 462
S.E.2d at 364.
254. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 364-65. Justice Carley, joined by Justice Thompson, dissented
forcefully, asserting that "[iut is clear that, in denying an application for a zoning variance,
the Board of Appeals exercises administrative, rather than judicial or quasi-judicial
powers." Id. at 796, 462 S.E.2d at 365. (Carley, J., dissenting) Accordingly, the dissent
maintained, this ordinance violated the "constitutional mandate of separation of powers."
Id.
255. 218 Ga. App. 668, 462 S.E.2d 764 (1995).
256. Id. at 668, 462 S.E.2d at 764. The zoning commission had approved a request to
rezone property owned by a cotton mill so as to allow the construction of a shopping mall.
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interest-special damage requirement for standing in rezoning cases, 2 7
the court of appeals held the association to fall short. "No expert real
estate appraiser, traffic engineer, land planner, or other expert witness
testified at the zoning hearing that any member of the Association,
whether adjoining landowner or otherwise, would suffer any substantial
damage to any substantial interest."2' Accordingly, the court reversed
the trial judge's finding of standing on the part of the neighborhood
association. 5 9
III.

LEGISLATION

Space limitations preclude more than mere mention of major local
government measures enacted by the 1996 General Assembly.

Addressing the state-local government relationship, a newly enacted
statute focuses upon local legislation affecting any county or municipality.2' The measure requires that a copy of the legislation be provided
to the local governing authority at the time the advertisement is
submitted to the local newspaper and an attesting affidavit of fulfillment
by the local legislation's author.261

In a striking modification of annexation by local statute, the legislature moved to condition the annexation upon a referendum in the area
to be annexed.26 2 This referendum requirement applies if the annexed

area is more than fifty percent residential and possesses a population in
excess of three percent of the annexing municipality's population.2'
Another enactment applies to annexations generally. It provides for
initiating municipal rezoning procedures on property proposed to be
annexed once the county is notified of the proposal. 2 ' The rezoning

257. Id. at 669, 462 S.E.2d at 765. "In order to challenge on the merits a decision of
a governing authority to rezone, plaintiffs must show special damages under the
substantial interest-aggrieved citizen test."' Id. (quoting City of Marietta v. Traton Corp.,
253 Ga. 64, 65, 316 S.E.2d 461, 463 (1984)).
258. Id. at 670, 462 S.E.2d at 766. The court reasoned that "neither the homeowners'
opinions that their property values would decrease nor their claims of nuisance met the...
test for standing." Id. As for fears of traffic congestion, the court said that '"such an
inconvenience is a condition incident to urban living. It is merely the result of normal,
urban growth and development." Id. at 671, 462 S.E.2d at 766 (quoting Lindsey Creek
Area Civic Ass'n v. Consolidated Gov't of Columbus, 249 Ga. 488, 491-92, 292 S.E.2d 61
(1982)).
259. Id. at 671, 462 S.E.2d at 767. "The trial court's decision reversing the Zoning
Commission is reversed." Id.
260. Ga. H.R. Bill 1385, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 28-1-14.
261. Id.
262. Ga. H.R. Bill 1192, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-36-2.
263. Or, if the annexed area includes 500 persons. Id.
264. Ga. H.R. Bill 1231, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3.
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public hearing must be conducted prior to the annexation, and the
property's zoning classification becomes effective on the date of the
zoning approval or the effective date of the annexation.2 6
As for zoning proper, the legislature imposed an additional requirement upon municipal and county zoning procedures. Those procedures
must afford each side in a zoning controversy a minimum ten-minute
presentation period at zoning hearings.2 During these presentations,
proponents and opponents of the proposed zoning decision may present
data, evidence, and opinions favoring their views.267
Reflecting public frustration over lease-purchase contracts in local
government financing,' the 1996 legislature moved to limit them.2'
First, the dollar amounts of lease-purchase contracts are now included
within the ten percent constitutional limitation on county and municipal
debt.269 Second, there can be no lease-purchase financing on items
rejected in local referendums within the past four years.270 Finally, for
lease-purchase acquisition of real property, there must be a public
hearing, and annual average payments on the contracts may not exceed
7.5% of the local government's prior-year revenues.2 7'
Additional concerns over local government financing materialized in
a fiscal impact requirement.272 The measure provides that no statute
having a fiscal impact on municipalities or counties is to take effect
before the first day of January of the year following enactment.273
Among recently enacted power enhancements for municipalities and
counties, there is the authorization to issue permits for charitable
organizations conducting solicitations on the local government's public
ways. 274 Additionally, there is the authorization for local governments
to enact ordinances prohibiting public indecency, even ordinances that
are more restrictive than state statutes.27 " Finally, local governments
are empowered to accept credit cards as payment for taxes, fees,
penalties, and the like.276

265. The statute includes requirements for notice and hearing. Id.
266. Ga. H.R. Bill 1203, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-66-5.
267.

Id.

268. Ga. S. Bill 567, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-60-13.
269. Thus, contracts are prohibited when total debt plus the amount of lease-purchase
contracts exceed 10% of the local government's tax digest. Id.
270. Unless the item is required by federal or state court order. Id.

271.
272,
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1383, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 1-3-4.1.
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1198, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 40-6-97.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1531, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-6-8.

276. Ga. H.R. Bill 1591, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-1-5.
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The 1996 legislature manifested considerable interest in the local
government's recoupment of mandated expenditures. Included was a
measure empowering municipalities and counties to collect copying and
other administrative costs in supplying requested public records.277
Having first provided a cost estimate to the person requesting the
records, the local government may employ any collection methods used
for collecting taxes or other assessments.278 Of similar sentiment,
another measure focused upon expenditures made necessary in providing
medical care to jail inmates. 9 This measure empowers the local
government to file civil reimbursement actions against inmates and
declares that the inmate's assets and property are subject to levy and
execution. 2 °
In further consideration of prison issues, the legislature authorized
keepers of jails to refuse to accept arrestees who have not received
medical treatment for obvious physical injuries of an emergency
nature.28" The arresting officer must take the arrestee to a health
facility or care provider to obtain a medical release. 8 2
In the local government law enforcement arena, the legislature
exhibited concern over the abuse of radar and laser speed detection
devices. 283 The statute requires the Department of Public Safety to
revoke a jurisdictions permit to use such devices if any officer's
individual certification has been withdrawn. 2s4
Finally, the legislature provided an alternative method for obtaining
inspections of installation of water and sewer lines on private residential
property.25 Unless the municipality or county opts out and continues
to require its own inspection, a master plumber or utility contractor may
when the installation is outside the building and
perform the inspection
2 6
underground.

8

277. Ga. H.R. Bill 1170, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71.
278. Id.
279. Ga. H.R. Bill 1154, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-4-50. This measure

applies when the inmate has no medical insurance.
280. Id. Inmates who do not cooperate may not receive good-time allowance in
reducing time to be served. Id.
281. Ga. H.R. Bill 1296, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 42-4-12. This applies
to arrestees not yet in custody and not to jail prisoners.
282. Id. If there is no health care facility in the county, then the keeper of the jail
must assume custody of the arrestee. Id.
283. Ga. H.R. Bill 1256, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 35-8-2.
284. Id. The jurisdiction must employ full-time or part-time certified police officers.
285. Ga. H.R. Bill 1221, Reg. Sess. (1996), codified at O.C.G.A. § 8-2-26.
286. Id. Should the municipality or county opt out, it must do so by ordinance or
resolution.
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps the concern was unwarranted: The nature of the beast
insures that local government simply requires judicial and legislative
solace. Perhaps the hope was unrealistic: What serves to "get it right"
today may well fail the societal demands of tomorrow. Those shifting
demands will, in all likelihood, keep local government suffused in the
spotlight of public, and legal, attention.

